A New Strategy Against Extremism and Terrorism
I start from the premise that our current strategy is not working. Five years ago, Donald Rumsfeld famously asked: "Are we capturing, killing, or deterring and dissuading more terrorists every day than the madrassas and the radical clerics are recruiting, training, and deploying against us?" So where are we today? Attacks -- historic highs; Al Qaeda -- reconstituted along the Afghan-Pakistan border. The Taliban -- resurgent. Hamas -- tightening its grip on Gaza. Hezbollah -- running a state within a state in Lebanon. The answer to Rumsfeld's question, I'm afraid, is no -- not by a longshot.
So what does a global counterinsurgency doctrine tell us about the war on terror? What's the correct take-away?
First -- understand the real battlefield. In a local counterinsurgency, the people are the center of gravity and the core objective is to isolate the insurgents by winning the support of the local population. Applied globally, the battlefield is the hearts and minds of the Muslim world. As Defense Secretary Robert Gates said: "We cannot capture and kill our way to victory." He's right. Which is why you fight not just a military battle but an "information war." Frankly, Al Qaeda is fighting an information war - even including an online town hall meeting conducted by Ayman al-Zawahiri.
We need to fight one too.
Second -- Another core principle of counterinsurgency doctrine is that "the more force you use, the less effective it is." Those aren't my words, they're General Petraeus'. And if you read the front page article in today's Washington Post they're pretty damn close to Secretary Gates' words too. Our most important weapons are often non-military: Ironically, some of our military's most significant successes against extremists have actually been humanitarian efforts after an earthquake in Pakistan and a Tsunami in Indonesia.
Third -- legitimacy, legitimacy, legitimacy. Without legitimacy, winning over hearts and minds is impossible. That's why this Administration's embrace of torture and indefinite detention has been so self-defeating. Our enemies have already overreached in places like Anbar and Amman, and we need the moral authority to capitalize on their failures. That starts with shutting down Guantanamo and making clear once and for all that the United States does not torture. Period.
Fourth -- know your enemy. Counterinsurgency doctrine emphasizes understanding our enemy. The theorist David Kilcullen has described Al Qaeda as 60 different organizations in 60 different countries, loosely linked by a shared ideology. Taken together, these groups form a global insurgency. The goal of Al Qaeda is to draw these disparate extremists into their broader struggle against the West, sometimes with logistical support, but more broadly by offering a unifying narrative: "Islam under attack."
Fifth -- be nimble. To defeat the enemy, we must adapt as they adapt and tailor our response to circumstances on the ground. In some places, that means development projects and television broadcasts. In others, it means visits to sheikhs in their tents and - when necessary - it means Predator strikes on high value targets. We can't fight Al Qaeda in sixty countries by ourselves, and so we have to recognize the importance of strengthening relationships and working with foreign governments and security forces.
Sixth -- and finally -- we must prevent local grievances from rising to a global level and drawing small groups of disaffected people into the larger struggle. That's why we need to draw the right connections and recognize how each theater impacts the others.
Obviously -- seen through this lens, invading Iraq was a grave mistake: We diverted resources from Al Qaeda. We failed to differentiate between a secular dictator and religious terrorists and in so doing played directly into Bin Laden's hands. Our own intelligence agencies called our presence in Iraq a "cause celebre" for terrorists worldwide.
